By Frederick C. Beiser
Histories of German philosophy within the 19th century ordinarily concentrate on its first half--when Hegel, idealism, and Romanticism ruled. against this, the rest of the century, after Hegel's demise, has been fairly missed since it has been obvious as a interval of stagnation and decline. yet Frederick Beiser argues that the second one 1/2 the century used to be in truth the most innovative classes in glossy philosophy as the nature of philosophy itself used to be up for grabs and the very absence of walk in the park ended in creativity and the beginning of a brand new period.
In this cutting edge concise historical past of German philosophy from 1840 to 1900, Beiser focuses no longer on subject matters or person thinkers yet relatively at the period's 5 nice debates: the id challenge of philosophy, the materialism controversy, the tools and bounds of historical past, the pessimism controversy, and the "Ignorabimusstreit." Schopenhauer and Wilhelm Dilthey play vital roles in those controversies yet so do many overlooked figures, together with Ludwig Buchner, Eugen Duhring, Eduard von Hartmann, Julius Fraunstaedt, Hermann Lotze, Adolf Trendelenburg, and girls, Agnes Taubert and Olga Pluemacher, who've been thoroughly forgotten in histories of philosophy.
The result's a wide-ranging, unique, and wonderful new account of German philosophy within the severe interval among Hegel and the 20 th century."
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Extra info for After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840-1900
That made it seem impossible for metaphysics to follow empirical guidelines. But in making this assumption, Schopen hauer argues, Kant revealed just how much he was still stuck in the paradigm of eighteenth-century rationalism. Although Schopen hauer agrees wholeheartedly with Kant that such a method is useless in metaphysics, he insists that there is no reason why meta physics must follow it. So far, however, Schopenhauer’s restatement of the problem and method of metaphysics seems to beg a basic question.
Despite its rich heritage and historical accomplishments, there were still serious questions hanging over the neo-Hegelian pro gram. One such question concerned the future of philosophy. If the task of critique is only negative, if its aim is simply to demolish the illusions behind alienation, what happens to philosophy when this task is complete? Should it not just wither away like church and state, as some neo-Hegelians believed? It was not surprising that Feuerbach, Bauer, and Marx eventually ceased to believe in the future of philosophy and that they held it should eventually disappear into anthropology (Feuerbach), history (Bauer), or po litical economy (Marx).
We cannot grasp this content or inner nature through its rela tions alone, Schopenhauer insists. 37 It is in just this context that we must understand another aspect of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics: his appropriation of the Platonic distinction between archetype and ectype. No part of his phi losophy seems more wantonly and brazenly metaphysical, more recklessly and daringly speculative, than his reintroduction of this Platonic doctrine in Book III of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Schopenhauer argues, however, that the Platonic distinction be tween archetype and ectype mirrors Kant’s distinction between 33 Cf.